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After the accounting scandals that have taken place mainly in the United States during 
the last years, some Spanish leading authorities have defended the idea that this kind 
of accounting problems cannot happen in Spain. They argue that accounting 
regulation in Europe, and specifically in Spain, make more difficult the use of creative 
accounting practices. 
The objective of this paper is to identify some evidence about the situacion in Spain. 
The study tries to demonstrate that some accounting practices of several of the  
companies quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange could be qualified as earnings 
management.  
To carry out this study, the authors have a nalysed the accounts of the 35 companies 
included in the stock market index IBEX 35. This index is calculated with the share 
prices variations of the most important companies quoted in the Spanish Stock 
Exchange.  
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When accounting information arrives to users,  mostly shareholders and investors, 
among other stakeholders, it has already gone through a process that has started with 
the involvement of company executives and later by the corresponding board of 
directors. Subsequently, the auditors become involved in  asserting the reliability of 
the accounts according to the current accounting and auditing regulation.  In Spain, 
the quality of this process is supervised by bodies such as ICAC (Instituto de 
Contabilidad y  Auditoría de Cuentas, the Institute of Accounting and Auditing, which 
is the Spanish accounting and auditing regulatory body), CNMV (Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores, the Spanish equivalent of the Seccurities and Exchange 
Commission) or the Spanish Central Bank, among others.  Analysts and rating 
agencies also become involved and finally, the media, which report their opinion 
about the situation and perspectives of companies. 
This process (see figure 1) can sometimes be negatively biased by various factors that 
affect the agents involved in the process: 
 
-Company executives and board of directors: The pressure for achieving the expected 
results is emphasized by situations like the present economic recession, and it is 
aggravated by the generalization of the incentive system based on stock options. This 
pressure, together with the deterioration of the ethical standards and the absence of 
signs of good corporate governance can increase the temptation for creative 
accounting practices and deceive the auditors, the shareholders and other users of 
accounting information. 
  
-Accounting regulation and supervision agencies: As it is pointed out below, some 
accounting standards have limitations. Also, there can be problems related to the 
supervision of the correct application of existing rules. Often, it is said that these 
agencies “look away” facing obvious cases of infringement of current norms.  For 
example,  a few months ago, the media (Pérez, 2002) commented on the pressure that 
the Spanish Central Bank has put on one of the leading Spanish banks (BBVA) trying 
to delay the regularization of  depreciated goodwill  in order to grant time to other 
leading Spanish bank (BSCH) which is in a similar situation but undergoing 
difficulties to get on such a regularization.  
 
-Auditors, analysts and rating agencies, the media:  It is possible that auditors and 
analysts have made mistakes, in some of the accounting scandals, not detecting frauds 
commited by the company officials. Even so, auditors and analysts have defended 
themselves saying that they, in fact, had been deceived by the company officials. 
Among the issues that are being questioned, the one that stands out is the impact that 
an auditing firm offers both consulting and audit services to the same company. 
Additionally, the impact that may have on analysts the fact that often they are 
branches of big financial groups which also offer brokerage activities.  For example, 
in August 23
rd 2001 an analyst was dismissed from the investment bank BNP Paribas 
                                                 
1 This paper is a part of the SEC 2000-1062 Research Project financed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Science and Technology.   3
after releasing a negative recommendation about Enron.  He was the first analyst to 
announce a negative analysis of Enron. A few months later, in May 21
st 2002, Merril 
Lynch agreed with the public prosecutor of New York to pay a fine of Euros 110 
million to avoid a trial on deceiving recommendations to investors. Moreover, Merril 
Lynch committed to separate the bonusses system of its analysts from the business 
that they may obtain for the investment bank (Nieto, 2002). 
Some comments were heard in relation to the interest of the media in broadcasting 
low quality information about the reality of companies. Despite this, the economic 
journalists often complain about the lack of relevant and reliable information that 
receive from companies.  It is clear that auditors nor analysts lead to brankrupcies, but 
if they fail to notify the problems on time they can harm shareholders and investors 
considerably. 
 
-Users of accounting information: The users are the ones that suffer the consequences 
of the problems mentioned. There is another important problem called the expectation 
gap. This gap refers to what users expect from accountants and auditors which is not 
the same as what these really offer.  Users expect that annual accounts inform the 
reality of a company in order to take right decisions. Hence, they expect that assets 
are valued in a similar level than market values. They also require that if the company 
is facing some problems, auditors and analysts report it early enough. 
However, auditors and accountants report the information that has to reflect a true and 
fair view of the balance sheet and economic situation of the company.  But by “true 
and fair view” accountants and auditors do not mean the reality, but what draws from 
the application of accounting regulation, even if these are far from reality  (Amat and 
Blake, 2002).  Accordingly, they can assert that they reflect the true and fair view of 
accounts that fail to reproduce most of the intangibles, the valuations in market prices 
of real estate and that, in addition, can vary according to each country´s accounting 
standards.  
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Figure 1. Some of the problems that affect the present crisis in accounting 
 
2.Some issues of accounting regulation 
 
There is no doubt that the credibility of the present accounting regulation is being 
questioned. A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (Dipiazza y Eccles, 2002) 
shows that only 20% of the analysts, investors and executives consider that 
information prepared under the present accounting norms is very useful to know the 
faithful image of companies. Therefore, according with the study, accounting is 
deficient from the user’s point of view.  
Some issues of the Spanish accounting regulation that deserve attention are: 
  
a) Historical cost: The principles of prudence and historical cost indicate that assets 
must be valued according to the lowest price between the acquisition price and the 
market price. Also, the acquisition price is reduced by the corresponding accumulated 
depreciation. These can also increase when assset revaluation laws are approved (the 
last one was in 1996). The consequence is that assets acquired a long time ago, 
especially buildings,  have an accounting value that is far from the real value. 
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b)  International accounting differences: As a lot of research has demonstrated, 
accounting regulation varies considerably from country to country. This explains why 
the same transaction can have a different impact on accounts depending on the 
country.  
The areas where differences are greater among countries  are: the criteria for valuing 
assets, the handling of revenue and expenses, asset depreciation and provisions, stock 
options, research and development, the acknowledgement of contingencies, pension 
plans, foreign currency operations, derivatives, norms of consolidation  and the criteria 
for estimating future transactions, among others.  
An interesting example is the one provided by the seven Spanish companies that are 
quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange and in the New York Stock Exchange. 
Important accounting differences were found in the accounts of companies that had to 
comply with the Spanish accounting regulation as well as the US GAAP. In all the 
cases, the earnings obtained according to the USA accounting criteria are inferior to 
the ones calculated under the Spanish standards. Conversely, the same type of 
comparison carried out two years before presented inverse results. This example (see 
figure 2) shows the effect that produces handling the goodwill depreciation differently 
in a year of decreasing stock market values since values in the United States are 
adjusted according to the market value of subsidiaries, whereas in Spain, goodwill is 
depreciated in a lineal basis, usually in twenty years.  
 
Company  Net income under Spanish 
accounting rules 
Net income under US GAAP 
BBVA  +2,363  +680 
Endesa  +1,479  +1,034 
SCH  +2,486  +2,176 
Repsol  +1,025  +980 
Telefónica  +2,106  -7,182 
Telefónica Móviles  +893  +320 
Terra  -566  -11,411 
Total  +9,786  -13,403 
Source: Financial accounts of each company.  
Figure 2. Net income of Spanish companies that are traded in the NYSE (data 
referred to 2001 in million Euros).  
 
These differences hinder the comparison among companies from different countries 
and also increase the mistrust of the users towards accounting. 
  
c)  Intangibles:  The basis of present accounting regulation were designed a few 
centuries ago when tangible assets, such as buildings and inventory, were the most 
important assets of a company. At the present time in many companies, a large 
portion of the value is in the intangible assets, such as trademarks, know-how of its 
employees, distribution network, customers, technology and others. Most of these 
assets are not included in the accounts, and explains the big difference between the 
accounting value of a firm and its market v alue (Lev, 2001). For example, on March 
30
th 2002, the market value in the USA exceeded 4.3 times the accounting value for 
the values included in the Standard and Poor’s Index. In Spain, on August 11
th 2002 
the value was 3.5 times larger that the IBEX35. 
 
d) Earnings management: Another problem in  accounting regulation is the wide 
scope for earnings management, also called creative accounting, practices  The 
objective of earnings management is carried out to make the accounts reflect what is   6
in the interest of executives and administrators (Griffiths, 1995). Through this 
process, the reality can be hidden and users deceived from the accounts. 
Earnings management is based on three pillars: 
 
-First,  accounting regulation allows that the same  transaction may be accounted for 
in different ways. We are referring mainly to the criteria for asset valuing, the 
accounting for revenues and expenses, depreciation and provisions, research and 
development, contingencies, pension plans, foreign currency operations, 
consolidation, among others. This allows the use of a more conservative or less 
conservative accounting approach according to specific interests. On the other hand, 
in some cases, companies can change the accounting criteria used in one year to 
another. In any case, this change has to be explained in the notes to the accounts and 
the auditors have to report about it.  
-Second, there are many operations that are not fully regulated by accounting norms. 
In Spain, for example,  accounting for stock options, the quantification of debt 
concerning pensions or some operations with financial instruments. 
-Finally, in order to account for certain transactions, optimistic or pessimistic 
assumptions about the future can be drawn. 
 
The combination of these three pillars explains why companies can manipulate their 
accounts without stepping outside the accounting regulation. This affects the 
accounting regulation of every country, including the USA as Largay (2002) points 
out:  “the gaps and flexibility of the US GAAP allow a great variety of accounting 
results.” 
In order to examine the impact of using the possibilities offered by the accounting 
regulation, it can be useful to apply the most conservative and least conservative 
criteria to a real Spanish company (figure 3). It can be observed  that the net earnings 
figure of this company can fluctuate between  -31 to +140, according to the Spanish 
regulation. The accounting criteria applied was the most commonly used, the most 
conservative and the least conservative. These criteria were applied to the transactions 
that took place during 2000. A base of 100 is considered for the net income of the 
company according to the most common criteria included in the Spanish accounting 
regulation. As an example, it has been considered that the average price method is the 
most common criterion when valuing inventories. Whereas, the most conservative is 
LIFO, and the least conservative is FIFO, considering that the Spanish accounting 
regulation accepts all three methods. 
 








Net profit according to the Spanish 
accounting regulation 
100  -31  140 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Figure 4. Variations in net income of a company using the most common criteria, 
the most conservative and the least conservative criteria according to the present  
Spanish accounting regulation  
 
Another example can be found in Telefónica, according to Muñoz (2002) “the 
analysts ...demanded a greater effort of realism in the accounts...In the end, there was 
a green light for the department of finance to provide a more realistic balance of 
assets of the company, by presenting the 2001 accounts to the SEC, the maximum   7
supervising authority of the US markets. This balance presented losses of around 
7,182 million euros, after a valuation of 8,452 million euros which included the 
acknowledgement that Endemol and Lycos were now worth less than a fifth part of 
what was paid for them at their time”. 
 
3.Detecting earnings management practices 
 
As mentioned before, an e arnings management practice means that a company 
chooses the most favourable accounting treatment among different aproaches 
permitted, or takes advantage of an area not fully regulated by accounting rules or 
makes an optimistic (or pessimistic) assumption about the future. 
To discover this kind of practices it is possible to use different approaches. 
There are earnings management practices that can be detected in the annual accounts 
of the company. Therefore, it is convenient to identify the accounting criteria utilized, 
which is explained in the notes. It is necessary to compare these criteria with those of 
previous years and those of the competitors. In this way, we can identify the changes 
of criteria in relation to past years, or identify accounting practices more (or less) 
conservative than those of the competitors.  
Considering that a company quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange can present the 
accounts including auditors' qualifications, it is also necessary to review the audit 
report in case there are any qualifications. Qualifications can be referred to changes of  
criteria in relation to the previous year or to other contingencies not included in the 
accounts.  
Another technique to use is the analysis of extraordinary results and results of 
previous  years, attempting to hide a variation that is not desired to appear in the 
ordinary results. The analysis of the evolution of the terms of customers, inventory 
and suppliers is also recommended, in order to detect manipulations that could affect 
these accounts (Spathis et al, 2002). 
Sometimes, accounts manipulation is done through related companies carrying out 
fictitious operations at prices different than market prices. Therefore, it is important to 
analyse the operations with related companies. 
Often, creative accounting is done with the pertinent authorizations of the supervising 
agencies which allow a company to apply rules different than the ones included in the 
present accounting regulation. These kind of authorizations are given after a lobbying 
process made by a company or an industry which tryes to take advantage of their 
power of influence towards the Government. Hence, it is necessary to revise possible 
authorizations for special cases, because even though being legal they are still creative 
accounting practices. For example, the Spanish Central Bank has occasionally 
authorized a bank under difficulties not to apply certain norm regarding provisions for 
bad loans. During times of currency devaluation, the Spanish accounting regulatory 
body also authorized certain companies, in the utilities industry for example, to stop 
applying the norms concerning losses incurred by differences in exchange rate. 
There are other accounts manipulations that are not detected by looking at the annual 
report. In any case, it is essential to revise the accounting books, even though these 
are revisions that are carried out  by the auditors.  
Sometimes manipulations can be done without stepping outside the present 
accounting regulation. For example, in figure 4 there are s everal techniques (like 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 14) that can be legal. On the other hand, the rest of the 
techniques in figure 4 are clearly illegal.   8
These techniques for detecting account manipulations have to be applied particularly 
in special occasions like when a company goes public or during changes in the 
executive team of a company. 
 
Earnings management techniques  Impact on the accounts  How can they be 
detected? 
1-Increasing or reducing expenses. Not 
recognizing  expenses from  stock options 
Reduction or increase in profits, 
equity, assets and debts. 
I, II, III, VIII 
2-Considering R+D to be an expense or 
capitalizing it
2. 
Reduction or increase in profits, 
equity and assets. 
I, II, III 
3-Expenses charged to reserves, instead of 
including them in the P&L account
3. 
Increase in profits.   III, IV,VIII, IX 
4-Off balance sheet financing through not 
consolidated subsidiaries or through 
Special Purpose Entities. 
Debt reduction.  IV, VII 
5-Changing the criteria for valuing 
inventories. 
Reduction or  increase in profits, 
equity and assets. 
I, II, III, VI 
6-Accounting for transactions making 
pessimistic or optimistic estimates about 
the future. 
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
I, II, III, IV 
7-Generating extraordinary results in order 
to improve the accounts, or vice versa. 
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
V 
8-Considering the extraordinary results as 
ordinary, or vice versa. 
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
I, III, IV, V  
9- Anticipating the identification of income 
or deflecting the identification of expenses.  
Increase in profits and equity.  I, II, III, IV, VI 
10-Deflecting the identification of income 
or anticipating the identification of 
expenses. 
Reduction in profits and equity.  I, II, III, IV, VI 
11-Fictitious sales.  Increase in profits, equity and  assets.  II, III, IV, VI, VII 
12-Compensating asset and liability 
accounts as well as income and expenses. 
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
III, IV 
13-Transactions valued at non-market 
prices, fake prices or willing to deceive 
with firms that are consolidated.  
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
II, III, IV, VI, VII 
14-Not providing information about 
subsidiaries with the excuse that it has a 
high strategic value
4. 
Increase or reduction in profits, equity 
and other assets and liabilities. 
III 
Note: I (compare with accounting criteria of past years)  
          II (compare with the competition’s accounting criteria and indicators)  
          III (analyse whether there are any qualifications in the audit report) 
          IV (examine accounting books) 
          V (analyse the extraordinary results and results from previous periods) 
          VI (analyse the evolution of client, inventories and suppliers periods) 
          VII (analyse the operations with related firms) 
          VIII (examine possible authorizations of special treatments) 
 Figure 4. Some earnings management accounting techniques, impact on the annual 
accounts and detection methods. 
 
Recently, many Spanish leading authorities have mentioned that the accounting 
scandals that took place in the United States are unlikely to  happen in Spain. In spite 
of these opinions, the analysis of accounts of the firms that are quoted in the stock 
exchange shows us a different perspective. For example, reviewing the accounts for 
                                                 
2 In Spain, R+D can be capitalized under several circumstances. 
3 This can be done if the company gets an special authorization by regulating or supervising bodies. 
4 This practice is possible according to Spanish accounting regulation.   9
2001 Jimenez and Abril (2002) stated in relation to companies included in the IBEX 
35 index and other big listed companies: 
 
-There are firms that should declare less benefits if they accounted the existing risks, 
specifically derived from the Latin-American crisis (for example, Telefónica, 
Telefónica Móviles, Repsol, Aguas de  Barcelona and Aurea), due to fiscal 
contingencies (for example, Koipe, Natra, Quijano, Tafisa, Vidrala, Urbas and 
Aforasa) or due to expenses charged to reserves (for example, BBVA and BSCH). 
-There are firms that show positive net earnings when they are i n fact incurring losses 
(for example, Sol Meliá and Campofrio).  
-There are firms that should declare even more losses (for example, Picking Pack and 
Tafisa).  
-There are firms that declare extraordinary profits as operating results (for example, 
Unión Fenosa). 
-There are firms that have not provided the required information to the auditors (for 
example, Pescanova, EADS, Avanzit, Funespaña and Urbas). 
 
From the previous information, it seems that there is a significant number of firms 
with accounting problems according to Jimenez and Abril (2002).  
 
4.Empirical study  
 
4.1.Research method and sample 
 
In order to identify the existence and importance of earnings management practices 
we have studied the annual accounts including the auditors' reports for the y ear 2001. 
The following findings have been considered as possible indicators of earnings 
management practices: 
 
-Changes of accounting criteria from one year to the other. These changes need to be 
explained and quantified by the auditors in their reports. 
-Other auditors qualifications included in their reports. 
-Special authorizations in order to apply accounting treatments not included in the 
present accounting regulation. Usually, these authorizations are explained in the 
notes.  
-Existence of extraordinary results and results of previous years in the profit and loss 
account of the year. 
 
We have chosen the 35 companies included in the IBEX 35 index for several reasons. 
First, these are companies listed in the Spanish Stock Exchange which implies that are 
companies that need to meet more complete and strict controlling rules issued  by the 
Government and stock exchange supervisory bodies. Second, these companies are the 
biggest among the more than five hundred companies listed in the Spanish Stock 
Exchange. Third, because of the previous reasons it could be assumed that these 
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First, we have analysed  the qualifications from auditors and special authorizations for 
accounting treatments not included in the present regulation (see figure 5). With this 
information we have calculated the adjusted net earnings. The data shows that 8 out of 
35 companies (22% of the companies) have auditors qualifications and/or 
authorizations for special accounting treatments. The impact of these adjustments 
represents 27% of the total net earnings of the 8 companies that have this kind of 
adjustments and 10% of the total net earnings of the IBEX 35 companies. These 
percentages are higher (30% and 15%, respectively) if we consider the individual 
accounts of each company (see figure 6). 
The following are the most common practices affecting  earnings that were found 
while examining the audit reports: 
 
-Expenses (goodwill depreciation or reestructuring plans, for example) charged 
against reserves, instead of including them in the profit and loss account. 
-Insufficient provisions (bad debts or the crisis in Argentina, for example). 
-Reduction of earnings due to future losses. 
 
Second, w e have analysed the extraordinary results. In figures 5 and 6 we have not 
included extraordinary items although they can be in some cases indicators of 
earnings management practices of the firms. The weight of extraordinary results is 
also important in IBEX 35 companies because in 2001 the extraordinary profits 
amounted 8.417 million euros and extraordinary losses amounted 9.299 million euros, 
which represented 54% and 60%, respectively, of the consolidated total net earnings 
(15.467 million euros): 
 
Total net earnings                                           15.467 million euros 
Extraordinary profits        -8.417 million euros  (54%) 
Extraordinary losses                           +9.299 million euros  (60%) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Net earnings before extraordinary results      16.349 million euros  
 
Third, we have analysed the notes to the financial statements. A number of practices 
that may be qualified as earnings management have been observed: 
 
-Expenses (risk provisions, pension plans, taxes) charged to reserves instead of 
including them in the profit and loss account. 
-Insufficient provisions. 
-Expense capitalization. 
-Changing the inventory valuation system. 
-Accelerating depreciation. 
-Extraordinary fees for pension plans. 
-Not reflecting expenses entailed by stock options.   11
 
 

















(d) = a+b+c 
% of increase (+) 
or reduction ( -) in 
net earnings 
(e)=(d-a)/a x 100 
Acciona  138  -67  0  71  -48 % 
BBVA  2363  +64  -479  1948  -18 % 
BSCH  2486  0  -696  1790  -28 % 
FCC  241  8  0  249  +3 % 
Gamesa  62  -11  0  51  -18 % 
Popular  565  0  -99  466  -17% 
Prisa  77  +21  0  98  +27 % 
Sol Meliá  59  -363  0  -304  -415 % 
Subtotal  5991  -355  -1274  4362  -27 % 
Other IBEX 
35 companies 
9476  0  0  9476  0 % 
Total  15467  -355  -1274  13838  -10 % 
Figure 5. Auditors qualifications, special authorizations and adjusted net earnings of IBEX 35 
companies using consolidated accounts (year 2001) 
 


















(d) = a+b+c 
% of  
increase (+)  
or reduction  
(-) in  
net earnings 
(e)=(d-a)/a x  
100 
Acciona  65  -60  0  5  -92 % 
Altadis  207  -11  0  196  -5 % 
BBVA  1312  0  -472  840  -36 % 
BSCH  1330  0  -417  913  -31 % 
Gamesa  7  -11  0  -4  -157 % 
Popular  447  0  -59  388  -13 % 
Subtotal  3368  -82  -948  2338  -30 % 
Other  IBEX 
35 companies 
3622  0  0  3622  0 % 
Total  6990  -82  -948  5960  -15 % 
Figure 6. Auditors qualifications, special authorizations and adjusted net 
earnings of IBEX 35 companies using individual accounts (year 2001) 
 
The joint analysis of the auditors reports and the notes can be summarized in figure 7. 
The percentage of increase or reduction of earnings has been calculated quantifying 
the qualifications included by the auditors in the audit report and the impact of the 
practices explained in the notes to the f inancial statements that  can be considered as 
earnings management. 
As indicated before, most of the related practices can be legal, although they alter 
earnings and the image shown by the financial statements. 
Analysing the auditors qualifications and the notes in the financial accounts of 1999, 
2000 and 2001 of the firms included in the IBEX-35 index we have found some 
evidence that several companies have done some kind of profit smoothing (see figure 
7): 
   12
-It can be observed that in 1999, a year with a positive economic environment, 
the predominant firms where those which whithout earnings management 
practices would have increased their earnings (9 firms would have increased 
their earnings while 5 firms would have reduced them).  
-Instead, in 2001, when t he economic situation was in a clear recession, there 
were more firms that would have reduced their earnings (10 firms would have 
reduced would their results while 3 firms would have increased them). 
 
Company  1999  2000  2001 
Acciona      -92% 
Acerinox  +3%   +1%   
Alba  +5%  +2%   
Altadis      -5% 
Acesa  -3%   -3%   
BBVA  -14%   -58%  -39% 
BSCH  -74%   -44%  -33% 
Bankinter  +2%     +2% 
Carrefour  +11%   +7%  +6 
Dragados  +13%   -10%  +10% 
Endesa  +2%  -219%   
Gamesa    -952%  -157% 
Gas Natural      -1% 
Iberdrola  -21%  -74%   
Indra  +3%   +9%   
Popular      -10% 
Prisa    +14%   
Red Eléctrica  -2%  -3%  -5% 
Sogecable      -2.511% 
Sol Meliá    -73%  -116% 
Telepizza    -252%   
Telefónica  +10%      
Unión Fenosa  +37%   -15%   
Figure 7. Percentages of d ifferences between published net earnings and 
adjusted net earnings after auditors qualifications, special authorizations and 
other earnings management practices observed in the notes of IBEX 35 
companies using individual accounts (years 1999, 2000 and 2001) 
 
It is important to note that all the practices observed, which can be considered as 
earnings management, can be identified through the published annual accounts of the 
companies. What is not clear  is if the users of the financial accounts are able to 
identify them and have the time to do it. It has been observed that the analysts' reports  
in Spain usually fail to  mention when a company has auditors qualifications, special 
treatments or other indicators of earnings management practices. 
 
5.Conclusions, limitations and directions for future research  
 
Users expect that the accounts will provide reliable, objective and relevant 
information that can be comparable to other firms at the national and international 
level. However, drawn from the previous analysis, it seems that earnings management 
is i mplemented in some companies, favoured by the current regulation. This may 
harm the reliability of accounting information. 
Profound changes in the accounting regulation and its supervision are required to 
fulfil the user’s expectations.   13
The possibilities f or earnings management must be reduced. Therefore, regulators 
must eliminate from the accounting standards the alternatives that allow different 
treatments for the same  transaction.  This may reduce the margin for earnings 
management. 
Considering than in  a few years many countries, including Spain, are going to adapt 
their regulation to the International Accounting Standards it is necessary that the 
IASB reduce the number of different treatments allowed. Each transaction should be 
accounted in just one way in order to reduce the possibilities of earnings management.  
It is crucial that companies listed in stock exchanges are forced to introduce in their 
accounts the qualifications from the auditors, when these can be quantified. As it has 
been explained this is not the case now in Spain. 
On the other hand, it is not enough to improve the norms. It is vital that the 
supervising agencies and the judicial system guarantee the execution of the present 
legislation. In this sense, we can be optimistic since the Spanish accounting regulatory 
body as well as other agencies have already adopted a positive attitude regarding 
reforms in the accounting regulation and towards a more accurate supervision. 
Finally, while all these recomendations are not implemented it would be desirable that 
analysts include the information concerning earnings management practices in their 
reports in order to help investors to take better decisions. 
This study has some limitations. Among them it should be mentioned that we have 
considered only earnings management practices, which can be identified easily 
through the published accounts. Recent cases like Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and 
Ahold, for example, suggest that the main important accounts manipulations could not 
have been detected without having access to information that  was not available in the 
published financial accounts. Another limitation is that IBEX 35 companies are not 
representative of the business environment of Spain. On one hand they have more 
controls and corporate governance g uidelines but  on the other hand they may have 
more pressure from the markets in order to meet analyst’s expectations. 
Our results suggest opportunities for further research. First, this kind of study could 
be applied to a different sample of companies in  order to identify what happens with 
companies not so big and with companies that are not listed in a stock exchange. 
Second, the study could be applied to more years to analyse the earnings management 
evolution in a longer trend. Third, a broader definition of creative accounting 
practices could be used in order to have a more complete view of the problem. 
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